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What Price Alimony
Carlos E. Lazarus*
The question of the wife's right to alimony under the provi-
sions of Articles 148 and 160 of the Louisiana Civil Code has been
so woefully neglected and misunderstood by the bench and bar
that it has not received the judicial consideration and appraisal
to which it is certainly entitled. The purpose of the following is
not to review every decision rendered on the subject, much less
to scrutinize in detail the judicial reasoning behind some of the
opinions contained in the so-called "leading cases." Nor is it the
intention of the writer to advocate social policies or reforms, but
rather to examine the law such as it may be and to suggest a
possible solution of the many vexatious problems arising in con-
nection with the subject.
A clear understanding of the basic concept of the rules gov-
erning the payment of alimony incident to separation and divorce
cases is of the utmost importance. This is at once apparent when
it is considered that a husband who has been ordered to pay ali-
mentary allowances to his wife during a separation suit has often
been unduly required to contribute toward the continued support
of his separated wife until a final divorce. Perhaps with a little
further analysis, it might have been shown that his duty termi-
nated when the judgment of separation was rendered.
At first blush, this may appear to be a startling announce-
ment indeed, for wasn't it the late Chief Justice who said that
the right of a wife to the alimony granted under Article 148 con-
tinued until the bonds of matrimony were finally dissolved?1
Moreover, Justice Brunot permitted a wife to come into court,
even after a judgment of separation had become final, to obtain
0 Coordinator of Research, Louisiana State Law Institute.
1. "From the wording of that part of the decree which put an end to
the payment of alimony pendente lite, it seems that the judge considered
that the litigation was brought to an end by the decree of separation from
bed and board, and hence that there was no longer any occasion for alimony
pendente lite. The rendering of a decree of separation from bed and board,
however, does not put an end to the wife's right to have alimony pendente
lite--which means nothing more than the wife's right to have the financial
support of her husband until the bonds of matrimony are dissolved." (Italics
supplied.) Arnold v. Arnold, 186 La. 323, 327, 172 So. 172, 174 (1937).
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alimony pendente lite.2 We need not go beyond the terms of
Article 148 to show the fallacy of these decisions, for it clearly
states:
"Art. 148. If the wife has not a sufficient income for her
maintenance pending the suit for separation from bed and
board or for divorce, the judge shall allow her, . . . a sum
for her support ... " (Italics supplied.)
A comparative review of the historical background and devel-
opment of the present codal provisions and of the early juris-
prudence on the subject will, it is hoped, point the way to
a better understanding of the problem and of the principles
involved.
I. THE FRENCH CONCEPT
Divorce, as an institution, was given legislative recognition
in France by a law of 1792. This law simultaneously repealed
the existing provisions regulating the separation of spouses which
merely put an end to their marital relations but prohibited them
from contracting a second marriage. Thus, when the Projet of
the Civil Code of 1804 was prepared, it contained only provisions
relative to divorce and none governing the divortium quoad
torum et mensam. The fact that the Code of 1804 did contain a
chapter on separation is due to the insistence of the Conseil
d'Etat. However, since the subject of divorce had already been
dealt with extensively, it was not thought necessary to treat of
separation from bed and board in as great detail, perhaps because
it was regarded merely as a substitute proceeding for the use of
those whose religious beliefs prohibited them from ever volun-
tarily dissolving the bonds of matrimony. The rules already
included in the chapters pertaining to divorce were therefore to
be applied to separation cases in the absence of positive law to
2. In Anzalone v. Anzalone, 182 La. 234, 161 So. 594 (1935), the husband
had obtained a judgment of separation by default which had become final,
it never having been appealed. Subsequently, the wife filed a rule on the
husband to show cause why he should not be condemned to pay her alimony
pendente lite. An exception of no right of action to the rule was maintained
by the district court, but on appeal the supreme court held that Article 148
was applicable. The wife had alleged in the application that she was in
necessitous circumstances and had no means of support and that the defen-
dant was able to pay her $50.00 a month. The court disposed of the matter
in the following language: "Inasmuch as these allegations must be accepted
as true, Rev. Civ. Code, art. 148, as amended by Act No. i30 of 1928, has direct
application to such a state of facts. . . . The quoted article of the Code is
mandatory, If it be shown that the wife is in necessitous circumstances, or
without Income for her support." 182 La. 234, 237, 161 So. 594, 595.
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the contrary and whenever their application would not contra-
vene the nature of the action. Thus it was that when divorce
was suppressed in 1816, the rules formulated nevertheless re-
mained applicable to separation from bed and board, which was
the only remedy available until 1884, when divorce was re-
established. 3
Necessarily then, what is said regarding divorce is equally
applicable to the concept of separation from bed and board, un-
less a result inconsistent with the latter should arise. Thus, the
causes for which a divorce can be obtained are also causes for
separation, and the procedures for instituting the action of di-
vorce, as well as the regulatory measures concerning the rights
and obligations of the parties pending the litigation, become
applicable to the action of separation from bed and board.
4
. The Code Napoleon contained three articles dealing with
alimony, two of which are found under the chapter on provi-
sional regulatory measures in divorce suits, and the other under
the chapter dealing with the effects of the judgment of divorce.
The first two were adopted in the following terms:
"Art. 268. 5 The wife, whether plaintiff or defendant in
the suit for divorce, may leave the domicile of her husband
during the proceedings, and demand alimony proportionate
to the means of her husband. The court shall assign the
house in which the wife shall be obliged to live, and shall fix,
if there be occasion for it, the amount of the alimony which
the husband shall be obliged to pay the wife."
"Art. 269.8 The wife shall be bound to prove her resi-
dence in the house assigned, as often as she shall be required
to do so; if she fails to make such proof, the husband may
refuse her alimony and, if the wife is the plaintiff in the suit
3. 1 Planiol, Trait 'l2mentaire de Droit Civil, 434, 435, nos 1214-1217
(4 ed. 1948).
4. 1 Planiol, Trait6 2lmentaire de Droit Civil, 454, nos 1306-1307 (2 ed.
1937).
5. "Article 268. La femme demanderesse ou ddfenderesse en divorce,
pourra quitter le domicile du marl pendant la poursuite, et demander une
pension alimentaire proportionnde aux facults du mari. Le tribunal indi-
quera la maison dans laquelle la femme sera tenue de rdsider, et fixera, e'il y
a 'lieu, la provision alimentaire que le mart sera obligd de lui payer."
6. "Article 269. La femme sera tenue de justifier de sa rdsidence dans 7a
maison indiqude, toutes les lois qu'elle en sera requise: 4 dfaut de cette
justification, le marl pourra refuser la provision alimentaire, et, si la femme
est demanderesse en divorce, la faire ddclarer non recevable 4 continuer sea
poursuites."1
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for divorce, he may have her declared without right to con-
tinue the prosecution of the suit."
The last, dealing with the alimony to be awarded following
the judgment of divorce, reads as follows:
"Art. 301.7 If the spouses shall not have conferred any
advantages on each other, or if the advantages conferred are
not sufficient to assure the maintenance of the party who has
obtained the divorce, the court may allow him or her, out of
the property of the other party, alimony which shall not
exceed one-third of the income of the other party. This ali-
mony shall be revocable in case it should become unneces-
sary."
It is significant that, whereas the duty to pay alimony follow-
ing the divorce is reciprocal, the alimony spoken of in Articles
268 and 269 is due only to the wife, and then only in those cases
when in the language of the articles, "there is occasion for its
payment." Other points of difference are also noted: The ali-
mony payable under Article 301 is limited to one-third of the
income of the debtor, and it is revocable when no longer neces-
sary. No such limitation as to amount is made in Article 268,
and the alimony is payable pending, and up to the termination
of, the proceedings.
A distinction is at once recognized, therefore, between:
(1) Alimony pending the proceedings for separation or for
divorce;
(2) Alimony after divorce; and
(3) Alimony after a judgment of separation from bed ana
board.
Each of these kinds of alimony is of a different nature, and
each is based on different concepts, as will be explained presently.
Alimony pending the proceedings. This alimony is con-
ditional. It is payable only to the wife, and although she may
claim it whether she appears as plaintiff or defendant, the court
will award it only when the circumstances warrant it, and only
when she has fully complied with the residence requirements of
7. "Article 301. s8 les dpoux ne s'dtaient fait aucun avantage, on si ceux
stipulds ne paraissafent pas suffisans pour assurer la subsistance de l'dpoux
qui a obtenu le divorce, le tribunal pourra lui accorder, sur le biens de F'autre
dpoux, une pension alimentaire, qui ne pourra excdder le tiers des revenus
de cet autre 6poux. Cette pension sera rdvocable dans le cas o- elle cesserait
d'dtre nicessaire."
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the codal provisions. It goes without saying that if the wife does
not leave the domicile of the husband (and this she is not bound
to do) she will not be entitled to the alimony provided for in
Article 268.8
The payment of this alimony is warranted, or, in the lan-
guage of the article, "there is occasion for its payment," when
the wife does not have income sufficient for her maintenance and
for the expenses of the litigation, even though the wife may be
wealthy in her own right. The reason for this, and the only basis
advanced by the French jurisprudence and by the commentators,
is that, since ordinarily during the existence of the marriage the
husband has the administration of the community and even of
the revenues of the wife's separate property, the wife who is
thus unable to dispose of or enjoy her own income must neces-
sarily look to the husband for assistance. 9 This allowance which
the husband is compelled to pay is, moreover, considered as an
advance imputable to the wife's share in the community upon
the dissolution thereof by the judgment of divorce, or of separa-
tion, as the case may be.10 But the converse is also recognized:
It may well be that the spouses are separated in property, or
that, even under the community regime, the wife has income
8. "Article 268 presupposes that the wife will leave the marital domicile.
If she remains, and if she receives sustenance, she cannot demand alimony
properly speaking. But if the husband refuses to give her the sums necessary
for her personal needs and for her children, she will be able to claim, in her
own right, a sufficient amount for these needs as well as for the expenses of
the proceedings." 3 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais, 302, 303, no
263 (2 ed. 1876).
9. Laurent states the rule as follows: "Under Article 268, the wife who
leaves the matrimonial domicile during the pendency of the suit, may demand
alimony in proportion to the means of the husband; but the article adds that
the court shall fix the sum that the husband shall be obliged to pay, only if
there be occasion for it. It may very well be that there may never be occasion
for its payment. In general the spouses are married under the community
r~gime. In such cases the wife does not have any revenue even when she
actually has property in her own right because the husband has the enjoy-
ment thereof. It will be the same where the spouses have stipulated against
the community or dotal r~gime, if the wife does not have any paraphernal
property. If the wife does not have any income, then it is necessary, nat-
rally, that the husband pays her the necessary sums in order that she may
defray her expenses pending the course of the litigation. But if the spouses
are separated in property, and if the income of the wife is sufficient to fur-
nish her the necessary, there will be no occasion to award her any alimony.
Similarly, where the wife Is receiving a pension from her parents payable to
her rather than to her husband, which is sufficient to provide her with her
needs, the husband can not be required to provide. This' follows from the
application of the principles regulating alimony in general: That there is no
obligation to furnish alimony to one who is not in need." (Italics supplied.)
3 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 8, at 300 et seq., no 260.
10. "Cette provision n'est qu'une avance faite par Pun des dpoux dl'autre;
elle est donc imputable sur ce qui revient 4 celui-ct lors du r~glement final
de sea droits." 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 433, no 1249.
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from other sources sufficient to provide for her sustenance and
for the expenses of the litigation; in which case, no alimony will
be awarded."
Where the circumstances permit the payment of alimony to
the wife, the amount payable is to be determined according to
the general principles governing alimentary allowances, in pro-
portion to the needs of the wife and the means of the husband.1
2
As indicated, divorce was suppressed in France in 1816 and
remained abrogated until 1884, during which period the code
provisions regulating divorce remained applicable to separation
proqeedings. In 1886, new procedural rules were introduced
which repealed the original Articles 268 and 269, but this repeal
did not affect the basis on which the right to alimony pending
the proceedings was predicated, although one of the effects of
these procedural modifications was the extension of the right to
alimony pendente lite to the husband as well. This is plain from
the language of Planiol, commenting on the new Article 238 of
the Code as amended in 1886. He states:
"The spouses having ceased to live together, there will
almost always arise the necessity to regulate the provisional
maintenance of the spouses during the proceedings. In nearly
every case, it will be the wife who will be in need of ali-
mony .... [But] the contrary situation may also arise. When
the wife is separated in property or is a public merchant,
she may be the one who has all the resources and the hus-
band who may be in need of assistance."'13
It is significant that, even as modified, the basis for alimony
during the litigation is the lack of sufficient income of the spouse
in whose favor it is given, and that the sum awarded is nothing
more than an alimentary allowance and one which, of necessity,
11. Laurent, loc. cit. supra note 9; 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 433,
nos 1247 et seq.; 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Chauveau, Trait6 Theorique et
Pratique de Droit Civil, Des personnes, 120, no 199 (3 ed. 1902);' 2 Planiol et
Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil, 199, no 604 (1926).
12. "The alimentary allowance is also governed by general principles. This
results from the language of Article 268, under which the alimony is to be
proportionate to the means of the husband, and, we must add as does Article
208, in proportion to the needs of the wife. In general this alimony comprises
sustenance and maintenance." 3 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 8, at 301, no 261.
13. "La vie en mdnage ayant cessd, 41 y aura presque toujours lieu de
statuer sur l'entretien provisoire des dpoux pendant le procs. Presque tou-
jours ce sera la femme qui aura besoin d'une provision alimentaire. . . . La
situation contraire peut se prdsenter. Quand la femme est sdparde de biens
o- commerQante, ce pout 6tre elle qui a en main toutes les ressources du
mdnage, si bien que le mart a bosoin do secours." 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 433, nos 1247, 1248.
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is merely provisional pending the outcome of the suit.14 It fol-
lows, therefore, that neither spouse will be entitled to his alimony
if he has property, the administration or enjoyment of which
furnishes him a sufficient income, or if he earns a livelihood by
his own industry or labor.15
Alimony after divorce. This alimony likewise depends upon
the fulfillment of certain conditions. It is predicated on Article
301 of the Code, and although there was some disagreement
among the earlier commentators as to the nature of the duty
imposed by this article, it is now well established that it is
quasi-delictual, in that it imposes a penalty upon the guilty
spouse. Since, upon the dissolution of the marriage, the mutual
obligations of fidelity, support and assistance between the spouses
is extinguished, the continued duty of one spouse to support the
other can be predicated on a tort basis only.16 It is to be noted
that the alimony is due only in favor of the innocent spouse.
Thus, Planiol states:
"It [the duty to support] is founded on the principle
already stated more than once that whoever causes damage
to another by his fault, is bound to indemnify the person
injured thereby. (Art. 1382). So long as the marriage sub-
sists, each of the spouses has an acquired right therein on
which they can rely. The fact of living together permits the
poor spouse to partake of the riches and well being of the
other; suddenly, by the fault of the latter, the resources of
the former are cut off, and he finds himself destitute. It is
always the case of making the guilty bear the responsibility
14. "C'est done tout ensemble une provision alimentaire et une provision
ad litem." 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 433, no 1249.
15. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Chauveau summarize the jurisprudence in the
following language: ".... but alimony will only be awarded when the claim-
ant does not have any income personally; if the property of which he has
the administration or the enjoyment procure him a sufficient income, or if
he earns his livelihood by his own work, no alimony will be awarded.
Baudry-Lacantinerie et Chauveau, op. cit. supra note 11, at 120, no 199.
16. 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 437, no 1259. Laurent assimilates the
payment of alimony by the guilty spouse to the payment of damages incident
upon the breach of a contract. 3 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 8, at 357, no 308.
Colin and Capitant have this to say: "The traditional answer to the question
is that the basis of the alimony established by Article 301 is the damage that
the guilty spouse has caused the other by making the divorce necessary
through his fault, if the Innocent spouse does not have sufficient resources
for his maintenance. The basis of Article 301 must be found, not in Article
212, but in the principle of Article 1382; it is an ex delicto basis. The alimony
granted to the successful spouse is the reparation of a tort unjustly com-
mitted .... ". (Italics supplied.) 1 Colin & Capitant, Cours Elmentatre de
Droit Civil Frangais, 378, no 368(B) (8 ed. 1934).
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of his own faults. It is to be observed that this obligation
to support rests on a principle totally different from that
of article 212: it is no longer a duty between spouses, since
they are not such any more, but it is the obligation to repair,
pecuniarily, the consequences of an illegal act. This obliga-
tion, after the divorce, is to a great extent, in the nature of
an indemnity; its purpose is to permit the destitute spouse
to have some of the property of which he has been deprived
by the fault of the other."'17
It follows from this principle that if both parties are at fault,
no alimony will be granted, and that where a divorce is granted
on the basis of a judgment of separation, the award will be made
only to the spouse in whose favor the separation was granted.' s
It also follows that alimony will be granted subsequently to a
judgment of divorce only where it can be shown that the neces-
sitous circumstances of the spouse claiming it was the direct
consequence of the divorce, for if the indigence of the claimant
is the result of extraneous circumstances, such condition cannot
be attributed to the fault of the other spouse. 9
The payment of this alimony is further conditional, as already
intimated, on the showing that the spouse claiming it be in neces-
sitous circumstances. Although Article 301 merely provides for
17. "Son fondement so trouve dans un principe ddjd signald plus d'une
fois. Quiconque a par sa faute causd un prdjudice 4 autrui est obigd d'lndem-
niser la personne lds~e (art. 1382). Tant quo Ie marriage durait, il constitualt
pour chacun des conjoints une situation acquise, sur laquelle il pouvait
compter; la communautd de vie permettait 4 l'epoux pauvre do participer au
bien-dtre de son conjoint; brusquement, par la faute de celui-ci, ces ressources
lui nanquent et il se trouve plongd dans la misdre. C'est le cas ou jamais de
faire subir au coupable la responsabilitd de sea fautes. On voit que cette
obligation alimentaire repose sur un ide toute diffdrente de celle de Part.
212: ce n'est plus un devoir entre conjoints, puisqu'lil n'y a plus de conjoints,
c'est l'obligatlon de rdparer pdcunialrement lea consdquences d'un act illicite.
Cette obligation aprds l divorce a donc au plus haut degrd le caractdre d'une
indemnit6; elle est destinde d restituer au conjoint pauvre un peu des res-
sources dont il est ddsormals privd par la faute de l'autre." 1 Planiol, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 437, no 1259.
18. "It is only the innocent spouse who has the right to demand alimony.
The guilty spouse could not claim it; and if both parties are at fault, neither
will have the right. By the same token, if the divorce has been granted in
favor of the wife, and the separation against her, the wife could not claim
alimony from the husband, because she would not have the right to invoke
Article 301 since the separation was granted because of her own fault."
1 Colin & Capitant, op. cit. supra note 17, at 377, no 368(B).
19. Devaye c. Ardisson (Cas. Oct. 18, 1926) Dalloz, (1927) I. 101. In the
above case, the Court of Cassastion said: "Mais, en raison de son fondement
indemnitaire, la pension ne peut 6tre accordde, postdrieurement au jugement
de divorce, qu'autant que Z'dpoux demandeur justiie que son 1tat de besotn
est la consdquence directe du divorce et ne provient pas d'evdnementa ulteri-
eurs qul ont entraind la diminution de sea ressources."
[VOL-. XI
WHAT PRICE ALIMONY
the payment of alimony when the spouses have not made to each
other any advantages, or when those that have been made are
insufficient for their maintenance, the jurisprudence is well estab-
lished that the determining factor is the actual need of the spouse.
It is held, therefore, that in order to determine whether the claim-
ant is entitled to the pension, regard must be had to the circum-
stances of each particular case. In this connection, Coulon has
this to say:
"The legislator has intended that the innocent spouse should
not be made to suffer the consequences of the divorce, and,
foreseeing the case where he might be without means, it
provided for the payment of a sum for his support by the
guilty spouse, as an indemnity. Thus, it must be conceded
that if the innocent spouse has means, there can no longer
be a question of alimony nor of indemnity. Lest it be sup-
posed that the law should be interpreted otherwise, it must
not be forgotten that the court is not bound by article 301;
but it is discretionary with the court to grant or deny the
pension. The judge may therefore, according to the circum-
stances, grant the demand for the pension or reject it....
"The pension will be due when the spouse who has
obtained the divorce is in necessitous circumstances, that is
to say, when, taking into consideration the age, sex, health,
social condition, habits, and a thousand other circumstances
of fact impossible of enumeration, the court finds that the
personal means of the spouse are insufficient for his main-
tenance.' '20  (Italics supplied.)
The personal means of the spouse spoken of, consist, among
other things, of the property which the spouse may personally
possess, or which he has or will eventually obtain upon the par-
tition of the community at the dissolution of the marriage. If,
20. "Le lIdgislateur a pensd que l'dpoux innocent ne devait pas avoir d
souffrir des consquences du divorce et, prdvoyant le cas oitl 4 serait sans
ressources, i4 a voulu que l'poux coupable fftt tenu, 4 titre d'indemnitd, au
sertice d'une pension alimentaire. On conqoit done que si l'dpoux, innocent
possdde de la fortune, it ne puisse plus dtre question d'indemnitd ni d'aliments.
A supposer que la lot doive seinterprdter autrement, i ne faut pas oublier
quo le tribunal n'est pas lid par l'article 301; c'est une facultd pour lui
d'accorder ou do refuser la pension .... La pension sera due lorsque Pdpoux
qui a obtenu le divorce se trouvera dans le besotn, c'est-d-dire lorsque, en
tenant compte de son dge, de son sexe, de sa sant6, de sa condition sociale,
de ses habitudes, de mille autres circonstances de fait qu'il es impossible
d'dnumdrer, le tribunal estimera que ses ressources personnelles sont insuffl-
santes pour assurer sa subsistance." 5 Coulon, Le Divorce et la Sparation de
Corps, 244 et seq. (1893-1897).
1951]
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therefore, upon the partition of the community, the share coming
to the spouses is sufficient to take them out of the category of
needy persons, neither one would be entitled to alimony.21
. Finally, the amount of alimony to be awarded is proportion-
ate to the needs of the claimant, but with the limitation that it
cannot exceed one-third of the income of the debtor. This follows
from the very terms of the article itself.22
Alimony after separation. There are no specific provisions
in the Code Napoleon regulating the payment of alimony after
a judgment of separation from bed and board. There are, how-
ever, two alternative theories upon which the duty to pay this
alimony may be based:
(1) the mutual obligations of support and assistance arising
from the marriage;
(2) the provisions of Article 301. regulating alimony after
divorce.
The latter has been applied on the grounds that in the
absence of positive legislation, the articles on divorce are ap-
plicable to separation cases. This is generally true, but it over-
looks the fact that in this one instance, Article 301 cannot properly
be extended because of the essential differences between divorce
and separation. Moreover, the articles on divorce are applicable
to separation cases only in the absence of positive law and when
their application is not contrary to the nature of the action. It
should be borne in mind that Article 301 is quasi-delictual in
nature, and that this must be so because under no other logical
theory can the obligation to support a former spouse be imposed.
On the other hand, the separation, although it puts an end to the
marital relations and brings about the dissolution of the com-
munity, does not dissolve the marriage, and consequently it does
not extinguish the mutual obligations of fidelity, support, and
assistance arising therefrom. There is thus a definite duty on the
part of the spouses to continue to support each other, even after
the separation, and there is no need for the application of
Article 301.
However, it is unquestionably recognized that alimony after
separation is due to the spouse in necessitous circumstances,
21. 2 Carpentier, Divorce et S~paration de Corps, 209, no 3527 (1899);
2 Planiol et Rlpert, op. cit. supra note 11, at 530, no 636.
22. 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 438, no 1261-1; 5 Coulon, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 245.
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irrespective of whether the claimant is at fault, and that the
amount to be awarded is proportionate to the needs of the claim-
ant and to the means of the debtor spouse, without being neces-
sarily limited to one-third of his income. Manifestly, therefore,
Article 301, if applied, would have to be enforced in its entirety,
with the effect that only the innocent spouse would be entitled to
claim the alimony and the amount would have to be limited to
one-third of the revenues of the debtor spouse. The fallacy of
the argument is at once evident since it destroys the positive
duty of mutual support previously established in the Code by
Articles 212 and 214.23
The essential points of difference between the three kinds of
alimony discussed are shown in the table on p. 411.
II. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE UP TO 1928
Divorce as we now know it was not legislatively recognized
in Louisiana until 1825 when the Code of that year was adopted.
Prior thereto, the only relief possible was a separation from bed
and board, which was regulated by the various articles contained
in Title V of Book I of the Code of 1808. These articles were
imilarly arranged and organized in a definite pattern showing
great similarity to that of the French articles on divorce con-
tained in the Code of 1804. Thus, the various articles were col-
lected into consecutive chapters treating, respectively: (1) of
the causes for separation; (2) of the proceedings for separation;
(3) of the incidental proceedings in connection with the suit; (4)
of the exceptions to the action; and (5) of the effects of the
judgment.
It is also interesting that not only was the organization of
the material borrowed from the French Code, but that the articles
included were so substantially similar to the divorce articles of
the latter that there can be little doubt of the intention of the
redactors of our Code to adapt these articles to the action of sep-
aration. Particularly is this true regarding the articles included
in the chapter regulating the "provisional proceedings to which a
suit for separation may give occasion." 24 Thus provision was
made for the keeping of the children of the marriage during the
pendency of the action ;25 for the separate residence of the wife,
23. See Baudry-Lacantinerie et Chauveau, op. cit. supra note 11, at 205,
no 316; 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 461, no 1335; 2 Planiol et Ripert, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 569, no 678; 3 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 8, at 401, no 848.
24. Book I, Title V, Chapter 3, La. Civil Code of 1808.
25. Id. at Art. 10 (Art. 146, La. Civil Code of 1870).
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pending the suit; for the allowance for her maintenance during
the proceedings, provided she has no sufficient income; 26 and for
the maintenance of the status quo regarding the property of the
spouses during the proceedings by prohibiting the husband from
contracting any debts on behalf of the community or alienating
the property thereof, and permitting the wife to restrain the
husband from disposing of any property in his possession until
after the termination of the suit.27
The Code of 1808, however, contained a provision difficult to
explain in view of its antithesis to the corresponding French pro-
vision and its inconsistency with other portions of the code itself.
It provided that in cases of separation, the donations made by the
spouses to each other would be without effect, but it permitted
the wife to demand alimony payments from the husband "accord-
ing to the exigencies of the case. '28 As the redactors of the Projet
of the Code of 1825 put it, "this article is founded upon none of
our ancient laws, and is in opposition with art. 44, chap. 5, tit. 7,
book 1, of our Code itself."29
In the Revision of 1825, very little change was effected in the
substance of the articles dealing with separation. Especially is
this true in connection with the articles regulating the provisional
proceedings, with the exception that they were also made ap-
plicable to divorce cases. In fact, the original pattern was re-
tained, and the only changes of any significance were (1) the
addition of divorce as a method of dissolving the marriage, and
the "amendment" of the alimony article above referred to. The
proposed amendment, after the fashion of Articles 299 and 300
of the French Civil Code, was to provide that in cases of separa-
tion the party against whom the judgment of separation was ren-
dered would lose the advantages or donations conferred by the
other, but would be entitled to retain them in all cases where
the judgment was rendered in his or her favor. At the same time,
the alimony features were to be omitted.3 0 These recommenda-
tions were adopted with the result that, as finally drafted, the
26. Id. at Arts. 11, 12 (Arts. 147, 148, La. Civil Code of 1870).
27. Id. at Arts. 13, 14 (Arts. 149, 150, La. Civil Code of 1870).
28. Title V, Chapter 5, Art. 18, La. Civil Code of 1808. "In case of separa-
tion, any donation which the husband or wife may have made the one to the
other, in consideration of their marriage, shall be void and without effect,
reserving to the courts of justice always the right of allowing an alimony to
the wife, according to the circumstances of the husband and to the nature
and exigencies of the case."
29. Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, 1 Louisiana Legal Archives 11 (1937).
30. See proposed amendment by redactors, Projet of the Civil Code of
1825, 1 Louisiana Legal Archives 11 (1937).
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Civil Code of 1825 contained absolutely no provisions on alimony,
even following a judgment of divorce, except Article 146,31 pro-
viding for alimony to the wife, pending the proceedings.
The Revision of 1870 adopted the articles of the Code of 1825
virtually without any change. It did, however, supplement the
divorce provisions by incorporating some of the implementing
legislation on divorce which had been adopted in the interim.
Some of these were Article 159, providing that the judgment of
divorce dissolves the marriage; Article 160, providing for the pay-
ment of alimony to the wife who had obtained the divorce; and
Article 161, prohibiting a subsequent marriage by the guilty
party with his or her accomplice in adultery.
It can thus be seen that the Revised Civil Code of 1870 con-
tains, virtually unchanged, the original laws on separation found
in the Code of 1808, with the necessary modification adopted in
1825 and subsequent additions to adapt them to the action of
divorce.8 2 It is also evident, in view of the great similarity of
some of the articles in the Code of 1825 to those of the French
Civil Code of 1804, that in adapting the original articles to the
action of divorce, the framers of the Code intended to follow the
French jurisprudence.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that no further refer-
ence to the two earlier Louisiana Codes need be made, except
where necessary to emphasize any points of distinction, particu-
larly since the present pertinent provisions of the Code of 1870
are substantially the same as they appeared in the Code of 1808.
What is said, therefore, with reference to the articles of the Code
presently in force, is intended to apply to the corresponding
earlier provisions, unless otherwise indicated.
Article 148 is found under that chapter of the title on divorce
and separation entitled "Of the provisional Proceedings to which
a suit for Separation or Divorce may Give Occasion," and like
the other provisions in this chapter, it is conditional in its appli-
cation. There will be no occasion for the application of Article
146 if there are no children of the marriage; 33 and if the wife
does not leave the domicile of her husband or if she has sufficient
31. This article became Article 148 in the Revised Civil Code of 1870.
32. Cf. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 Louisiana
Legal Archives (1940).
33. The temporary nature of these provisions are evidenced by the fact
that though the custody of the children is generally awarded to the wife
pending the suit, permanent custody is given to the party who has obtained
the separation or divorce. See Arts. 146, 157, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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income for her maintenance during the suit, the husband will not
be required to pay her the alimony provided in Article 148.34
Likewise, there will be no occasion for the application of Articles
149 and 150, if the husband does not intend to dispose of the
property of the community.
Article 160, on. the other hand, is found under the chapter
dealing with the effects of a judgment of separation or divorce.
As originally adopted, it authorized the court, in its discretion,
to award alimony to the wife who had obtained the divorce, if
she was "without sufficient means for her maintenance." 35
Textually, Article 148 is more likely to have been taken
from Article 34 of Book I, Title IV of the Projet du Gouverne-
ment of 1800, rather than from the text actually adopted as
Article 268 of the Code Napoleon of 1804. The article in the
Projet reads as follows:
"If the wife has not a sufficient income for her mainte-
nance during the suit for divorce, the court shall allow her
a sum for her support proportionate to the means of her
husband.
"The husband cannot be compelled to pay this allowance
unless the wife proves that she has constantly resided in
the house assigned by the court."3 6
Article 160, however, is taken textually from Section 10 of
an act of 1827, re-enacted in 1855, and included in the Revised
Statutes of 1870 as Section 1197.Y7 It is supposed, because of the
points of similarity, that its origin was Article 301 of the French
Civil Code of 1804, but it is more likely to have been based upon
the French jurisprudence interpreting that article as explained
by the French commentators. Be that as it may,. its source is
essentially French, and,. following the admonition of our own
courts, the French jurisprudence on the subject should be at least
consulted in aid of its interpretation and application. 8
Although the Code of 1808 contained a provision governing
34. Suberville v. Adams, 46 La. Ann. 119, 14 So. 518 (1894); Jones v.
Douglass, 158 La. 57, 103 So. 441 (1925).
35. Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870. This article was taken directly from
Section 8 of "An Act Relative to Divorce," March 19, 1827, pp. 131, 132. The
identical provision was subsequently re-enacted as Section 7 of Act 307 of
1855, and later included in the Revised Statutes of 1870, as Section 1197
thereof.
36. Projet du Gouvernement, Book I, Tit. IV, Art. 34 (1800).
37. See note 35, supra.
38. State ex rel. Hill v. Judge, 114 La. 44, 38 So. 14 (1905); Player v.
Player, 162 La. 229, 110 So. 332 (1926).
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the payment of alimony after separation, the only provisions now
included regulate the payment of alimony during the litigation,
whether divorce or separation, and alimony to the successful
spouse in a suit for divorce. Nevertheless, we know alimony
after separation is often awarded to the wife and the question
necessarily arises, on what basis?
At the outset, it must be accepted that, as in France, our
courts have recognized the three kinds of alimony already dis-
cussed. Because of the essential differences among these kinds
of alimony, the reasons on which they are based cannot be the
same. If this premise is accepted, no difficulty will arise in appli-
cation of the principles underlying these different concepts. An
inquiry into each of these kinds of alimony is therefore pertinent.
Alimony pendente lite. Articles 147 and 148 of the code
require the payment of alimony to a wife who has not sufficient
income for her maintenance during and up to the termination of
the suit, provided she has left the common dwelling or at least
declared her intention to do so. But Article 147 is not manda-
tory, it is merely conditional, and no duty is imposed upon the
wife to leave the common dwelling. Thus a situation may well
arise where the wife has not left the domicile of the husband
prior to or during the pendency of the suit; in which case, under
the express provisions of Article 148, no alimony will be due.39
Article 148 is further conditional upon the wife's not having an
income sufficient for her maintenance during the proceedings, so
that where she has an independent source of income which will
provide her with the necessary funds for her maintenance, no
alimony will be awarded. These are the express terms of the
law. What, then, is the reason for this alimony?
Our courts have not favored us with an analytical discussion
of the question. It has sufficed to say that the duty to pay this
alimony arises from the duty of the husband to support the wife
during the marriage. 40 This may very well be so in the last
39. Suberville v. Adams, 46 La. Ann. 119, 14 So. 518 (1894); Jones v. Doug-
lass, 158 La. 57, 103 So. 441 (1925).
40. "On the other hand, the alimony paid to the wife pending the suit for
divorce arises solely from the marriage relation and the duty of the husband
to support her." Player v. Player, 162 La. 229, 110 So. 332, 333 (1926). "In
fact, the right of a wife to receive alimony during the pendency of a suit for
divorce or separation from bed and board is merely the obligation of the
husband to support his wife .. " Arnold v. Arnold, 186 La. 323, 172 So. 172, 174
(1937). (Italics supplied.) In this connection Cf. Suberville v. Adams, 46 La.
Ann. 119, 14 So. 518 (1894), where the wife who was plaintiff in the divorce suit
and had been denied alimony pendente lite because of her failure to comply
[VOL. XI
WHAT PRICE ALIMONY
analysis, but if this is the only basis, why the existence of Article
148,? It had already been provided that the spouses owed to each
other mutually, fidelity, support and assistance.41 Was it because
this reciprocal duty was to be limited to the husband only, and
if so, why? Or was it because the obligation of support flowing
from the marriage was to be modified, and enforced only in
certain cases?
It must be remembered, and it cannot be overemphasized,
that Article 148 is conditional, and that the conditions upon which
its application rests are not necessarily those under which the
general duty of support is exacted. Whereas Article 148 depends
for its enforcement on the wife's having been assigned a separate
domicile and in not having a sufficient income for her mainte-
nance, the husband's duty of support flowing from the marriage
depends solely upon the reciprocal duty of the wife to live with
him and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside. It is evi-
dent, therefore, that there must have been other immediate
reasons for the specific provisions contained in Article 148. The
fact remains that as a result of the marriage, the husband becomes
the head and master of the community, and as such, the sole
administrator. This being so, the wife has no control over the
sources of revenue, nor of the revenues themselves, and conse-
quently, the husband must be called upon to give her a sufficient
amount for her maintenance while the suit is pending, and while
she resides in a dwelling other than the conjugal domicile. But
what if the wife has other independent sources of income? The
answer lies in the article itself, for it provides that the wife must
show that she lacks sufficient income for her maintenance in
order to receive the alimony provided for. Further, the fact that
the wife may have sufficient means in her own right is immate-
rial, lack of income or inability to use that income if she has it
being the determining factor.
The basis for Article 148, therefore, is not technically the
husband's duty of support (although this may be the ultimate
with the separate residence requirements of Article 147, alleged that the
husband was nevertheless duty bound to support her during the suit because
of Articles 119 and 120. The court answered this contention as follows: "In
answer to the contention that the husband owes to the wife support and
assistance .... it is sufficient to say that those are among the obligations that
the law imposes under the title of 'Husband and Wife.' . . . But they are not
actionable during the existence of the marriage, and can only be enforced
after the marriage has been dissolved ......
41. Art. 119, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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reason for it) but rather the wife's incapacity or inability to enjoy
the revenues of her property during the marriage.
Alimony after divorce. Article 160 of the Civil Code finds
its counterpart in Article 301 of the French Code of 1804, and
although it is not identically worded, its meaning is the same. 42
There has been little or no difficulty in the application and
.understanding of Article 160. It is generally recognized that the
obligations it imposes are quasi-delictual in nature, the only
condition being that the wife who is entitled to claim the alimony
be in necessitous circumstances. The difficulty, if any, has been
in what is meant by "necessitous circumstances."
Obviously, a person cannot be in necessitous circumstances
if he has property or other assets. A person may have no appre-
ciable income and yet have sufficient property which would take
him out of the category of needy persons entitled to alimony.43
The question, therefore, as to whether a person has sufficient
means for her maintenance is necessarily one of fact to be deter-
mined in each particular case; and with regard to the rights to
demand alimony under the provisions of Article 160, the wife is
held to the duty of proving her necessitous circumstances. 44
As used in Article 160, therefore, the word "means" must be
interpreted to convey the idea of property and not necessarily
income. It is used in the same sense that the word "means" is
employed in connection with Article 148 when it speaks of the
42. See note 35, supra.
43. Abbott v. Abbott, 199 La. 65, 5 So. 2d 504 (1941); Smith v. Smith, 217
La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950). In the Abbott case, alimony was denied to a wife
who owned real estate valued at about $1200, an automobile, and "a lot of
valuable household furniture." In the Smith case the court said: "In other
words, under Article 160, the Court is not concerned with the wife's income
as such, but only with the means she has, including income, and whether
they are sufficient for her maintenance." Alimony was denied because the
wife had assets valued at $20,000 producing an income of $35.00 per month.
See also Bocage v. Lombard, 114 La. 1005, 81 So. 604 (1919); Jackson v. Burns,
116 La. 695, 41 So. 40 (1906). Cf. Russo v. Russo, 208 La. 17, 22 So. 2d 671
(1945).
44. Jackson v. Burns, 112 La. 854, 36 So. 756 (1904); Abbott v. Abbott, 199
La. 65, 5 So. 2d 504 (1941). In the Abbott case, the court stated (199 La. 65,
74, 5 So. 2d 504, 507): "The burden of proof is on the divorced wife claiming
alimony under Article 160 of the Civil Code to show that she is in necessitous
circumstances. In the absence of such proof, the court must decline to decree
that alimony is due by her former husband." Contra: Bernard v. Gonzales,
170 La. 474, 128 So. 281 (1930).
It is to'be noted, however, that our courts do not require that the wife
be absolutely destitute in order to qualify under the article. Though the term
"necessitous circumstances" has come to be used as synonymous with "insuffi-
cient means," it has been held that under the express language of Article 160,
it is presumed that the wife should have some means, which, however, are
not sufftcient for her maintenance. Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32
(1950).
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alimony to be paid to the wife by the husband "in proportion to
his means. 45
Finally, in order to determine whether the wife is in need,
regard must be had, among other things, to, the property she
may possess in her own right, as well as the property she may
have obtained from the liquidation of the community of acquets
and gains upon the dissolution of the marriage. 46
Alimony after the separation. It is in connection with the
award of alimony after separation that most of the confusion
arises. Like the French Code, the Louisiana Civil Code is silent
on the subject. At least it does not expressly provide for or
regulate its payment. On what basis, then, is it or should it be
awarded?
It is not at all clear from the reported cases, how and by
virtue of what authority an order for the payment of alimony is
incorporated in a judgment of separation. But this seems to be
the accepted practice and, as far as it has been possible to deter-
45. In interpreting the word "means," as used in Article 148, the Supreme
Court said: "Nothing is said in this article [Art. 148J about the income or
earnings of the husband. While the separation or divorce proceedings are
pending, the Code says that the husband must pay for the support of his wife
out of his 'means.' The word 'means' as used in this article refers to the
husband's resources and not necessarily to his income. His 'means' may
consist either of property of a physical character, frequently referred to as
assets, or it may consist of income from such property or income from labor
or services performed. The word 'means,' as used in this article of the Code
signifies any resources from which the wants of life may be supplied. The
amount necessary for the support of a wife under such conditions as those
referred to in this article is a debt which the husband must discharge out of
his means, and his means may consist of money in his pocket, cash in bank,
income from whatever source, or assets in the way of real or personal prop-
erty. . . ." (Italics supplied.) Bowsky v. Silverman, 184 La. 977, 982, 168 So.
121, 122 (1936).
46. Upon a judgment of separation or divorce, the community of acquets
and gains is dissolved and the wife becomes the owner in her own right of
one-half thereof. In those cases where the assets of the community are
substantial, there should be little difficulty in establishing the ineligibility of
the wife to alimony because she will certainly not be in necessitous circum-
stances. Cf. Abbott v. Abbott, 199 La. 65, 5 So. 2d 504 (1941); Smith v. Smith,
217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950). It will be the same even where the community
assets are negligible, if the wife is shown to have other means of support, as
for example where her income from other sources is considered sufficient for
her maintenance. Russo v. Russo, 208 La. 17, 22 So. 2d 671 (1945). See also
Jackson v. Burns, 116 La. 695, 41 So. 40 (1906), overruled in Abrams v. Rosen-
thal, 153 La. 459, 466, 96 So. 32, 34 (1923), where the court states: "A better
statement of the rule is that a wife, without property of her own, who sues
her husband for a separation from bed and board, is not required to go out
into the arena of business in order to obtain the funds necessary to support
herself, as the law imposes that obligation upon the husband, but, if she does
choose to earn her own living pending the issue of the suit, she thereby takes
herself out of the provisions of article 148 of the Civil Code to the extent of
her earnings." (Italics supplied.)
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mine, a practice which has not been seriously contested. 47 Appar-
ently it is based on the erroneous belief that Article 148, under
which alimony pendente lite has been awarded at the beginning
of the suit, authorizes the continuance of the alimony during the
period of separation. Nothing can be more illogical and unsound.
But the fault seems to be a false interpretation of the basic con-
cepts and the failure to comprehend the. purport of the juris-
prudence which the courts have admonished should be followed
in interpreting the alimony provisions of the Code.
48
The early jurisprudence on the subject was more in line
with the French concept of limiting the application of Article 148,
as its language unmistakably requires, to the time it took the
controversy to be finally decided, for until then, the litigation
continued to pend. But then, its application terminated.
49 It
47. Notice the statement of the case by the court in Smith v. Smith, 217
La. 646, 648, 47 So. 2d 32, 33 (1950), as follows: "The judgment [rendered in
1947] decreed a separation from bed and board, partitioned the community
of acquets and gains then existing between them, awarded custody of the
minor child to the wife and allowed alimony pendente lite to the wife in the
sum of $125.00 per month for her support and maintenance," which alimony,
as can be gleaned from the opinion, continued to be paid by the husband
after the separation until a divorce was rendered some 18 months later, the
petition for divorce having been filed in October, 1948.
It is submitted that if the wife's share in the community property (which
was partitioned by the judgment of separation) was $20,000.00 and constituted
"sufficient means" so as to declare her ineligible to alimony under Article
160, the wife was not in necessitous circumstances during the period follow-
ing the judgment of separation, and consequently, not eligible to alimony
.subsequently thereto. The erroneous belief that the suit for separation under
which the order for alimony pendente lite is made is never final is respon-
sible for the inequitable result reached. Despite judicial expression to this
effect, a suit whether for divorce or for separation terminates when the final
judgment is rendered, either decreeing or rejecting the plaintiff's demands.
Notice that Article 148 provides for the payment of alimony pendente lite
either "in a suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce," and if
the alimony granted pendente lite in a suit for divorce, terminates upon final
judgment, why does it not terminate also if the final judgment is one decree-
ing the separation from bed and board?
48. On more than one occasion the court has indicated its acceptance of
the French jurisprudence on the subject as determinative of the intent and
purpose of the alimony articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. Cf. State ex rel.
Hill v. Judge, 114 La. 44, 38 So. 14 (1905); Player v. Player, 162 La. 229, 110
So. 332 (1926).
49. In State ex rel. Hill v. Judge, 114 La. 44, 38 So. 14, 15-16 (1905), the
court indicates that alimony granted the wife under Article 148 terminates
when the judgment rendered becomes final: "Immediately after the judg-
ment will have become final . . . then her right to alimony will fall, and
whatever Is accorded her as a pension or support will Immediately take the
place of and succeed to the judgment of alimony ... " In Lee v. Koester, 155
La. 756, 757, 99 So. 588, 589 (1924), the rule is stated as follows: "Alimony
pendente lite, in a suit for separation, or for divorce, is merely an incident of
such suit. The suit for separation having been finally determined, and no
appeal having been taken from the judgment rendered therein, the right to
alimony, because of the suit, falls." (Italics supplied.)
In Blenvenue v. Bienvenue, 186 La. 429, 172 So. 517 (1937), after a judg-
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cannot logically be said, therefore, that, after a judgment of
separation has become final, an order for alimony to be paid
thereafter is authorized under Article 148. Nevertheless, this is
what appears to have been done, and insignificant as it may
seem, it is the very point which brings about the inequities and
abnormal results complained of.
The French found no necessity for any specific provision
authorizing the payment of this alimony, since the duty to pay it
arises, as our courts have intimated, from the mutual and recip-
rocal obligation of support and assistance flowing from the mar-
riage relationship. But, since the payment of any alimony,
whether as an incident to a divorce, separation, or otherwise, is
warranted only where the claimant is in need, and then only in
proportion to the means of the debtor, the spouse claiming it
must show that he or she is in necessitous circumstances.
The following excerpt from an early decision of Justice
Breaux is pertinent at this point. He says:
"It follows there is scant analogy between alimony paid
during the separation from bed and board and the pension
or support required to be paid in the judgment of divorce.
The latter is an indemnity to which the one who obtains the
divorce is entitled.
ment of divorce had been rendered against the wife on grounds of four year
separation and had presumably become final, she ruled the former husband
into court to show cause why he should not be compelled to pay her alimony,
alleging she was not at fault. Alimony pendente lite had been granted the
wife and it was contended in her behalf that "since the judgment granting
[it] was not modified or set aside by the final judgment of divorce, the for-
mer is in full force and effect and enforceable." The court disposed of this
contention as follows: "This ... is without merit because alimony pendente
lite is authorized by article 148 of the Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 130
of 1928, 'if the wife has not a sufficient income for her maintenance pending
the suit . . . for divorce,' and necessarily the judgment granting alimony
pendente lite ceases to have any effect when a ftnal judgment of divorce is
rendered in the case."
However, where the judgment is appealed, whether by the defendant or
by the plaintiff, the litigation necessarily continues until a final judgment' is
rendered on appeal, and the order for alimony pendente lite necessarily con-
tinues in force until a final judgment on the merits is rendered. This is well
illustrated in Donnels v. Bouillion, 165 La. 145, 147, 115 So. 439, 440 (1928) in
the following language: "In our opinion the order for alimony pendente lite
did not cease to continue in force after the signing of the judgment on the
merits. The purpose of that alimony is to provide for the sustenance of the
wife pending the litigation. . . . The suspensive appeal from the judgment
on the merits was taken promptly after that judgment was signed. The liti-
gation therefore continued to pend after the judgment on the merits was
signed, and for that matter is still pending, though pending on appeal .... "
It would seem, therefore, that the order for alimony pendente lite is rendered
ineffective as soon as the delays for taking an appeal from the judgment on
the merits of the suit have elapsed, or, if the judgment on the merits is timely
appealed, when it becomes final in the appellate court.
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"... We compared the articles of our Code with the Code
of France, and consulted the jurisprudence under the latter.
"The laws are substantially similar, and the jurispru-
dence accentuates the difference between the two-judgment
for alimony during the marriage and judgment of mere sup-
port after the divorce. Article 212 of the French Code cor-
responds to Article 148 of our Code, and Article 301 of the
same Code corresponds to Article 160 of our Code, and under
each of the articles of the Code Napoleon, the courts of
France are of opinion that there is no analogy of the one to
or with the other."50
The court was speaking, of course, of the difference between
alimony after a judgment of separation and alimony after divorce.
True it is that there is, according to the French, no analogy be-
tween the two. The court was in error, however, in saying that
Article 212 of the Code of France upon which alimony after
separation is based, corresponded to our Article 148. As a matter
of fact, Article 212 of the French Code is the exact counterpart of
Article 119 of our Civil Code, which imposes the reciprocal duty
of fidelity, support, and assistance between the spouses. It is
submitted, therefore, that what the court had in mind was that
the alimony payments during the interim period between the
judgment of separation and the divorce were payable because of
the duty of support established in the code; but whether or not
in error as to the import of the French jurisprudence regarding
the application of Article 148, the fact remains that the court
accepted the principle that the alimony which is payable subse-
quent to the judgment of separation is based on the duty of
support flowing from the marriage relationship. This being so
(and in view of innumerable decisions upholding this rule it
could not be seriously contested), a novel but logical conclusion
must be reached-in a proper case, the wife owes alimony to
the husband, the obligation of support being mutual and recip-
rocal.5'
50. State ex rel. Hill v. Judge, 114 La. 44, 47, 38 So. 14, 15 (1905).
51. Art. 119, La. Civil Code of 1870. "The husband and wife owe to each
other, mutually, fidelity, support and assistance." (Italics supplied.) It is on
the basis of Article 212 of the French Civil Code which differs not at all from
ours, that the French impose upon the wife the duty to pay alimony to the
husband during the separation when he is in necessitous ciriumstances. (1
Planiol, op. cit. supra note 4, at 433, nOs 1247, 1248). It is true that Article 120
would seem to indicate that the duty of support is one-sided only, but it
should be noted that the French Code also contains an identical provision in
Article 214 of their Code. As a matter of logic, Article 120 is the complement
of Article 119. Once the reciprocal duty of support is established, Article 120
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It also follows that since the award to be made is in the
nature of an alimentary allowance, it likewise must be governed
by the general rules governing alimony,5 2 and consequently, no
award should be made unless it is proved that the claimant is in
necessitous circumstances. In this respect, alimony after separa-
tion and alimony after divorce are subject to the same rules.
Further following the French jurisprudence, other distinc-
tions should be made between alimony after divorce and alimony
after separation. Whereas alimony after divorce is limited to
one-third of the income of the debtor, no such limitation should
be imposed in alimony following a judgment of separation. Again,
whereas alimony after divorce cannot be obtained if the claim-
ant is at fault, alimony after separation is awarded to the claim-
ant regardless and in spite of guilt. In this latter respect, ali-
mony after separation is similar to alimony pendente lite.
III. EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS SINCE 1928
Heretofore an attempt has been made to interpret the codal
provisions as they were prior to 1928. Since then, Article 147 has
been repealed, and Article 148 has been amended to provide for
the payment of alimony pendente lite to the wife, whether she
appears as plaintiff or defendant in the suit, omitting the resi-
dence requirements which formerly existed. Article 160 has also
been amended to provide for the payment of alimony to the wife
who is not at fault, when a divorce has been obtained on the
basis of a voluntary separation. In addition a separate statute
had been enacted providing for alimony to a wife in whose favor
the judgment of separation from bed and board was rendered,
when a judgment of divorce is rendered in favor of the husband
based on the judgment of separation. 3
The effect of these amendments and subsequent legislation
should not be considered as destroying the fundamental basis of
the-alimony articles. True it is that Article 147 was repealed, but
this merely means that the wife claiming alimony pendente lite
provides that the wife is bound to live with her husband and that he is
obliged to receive her and furnish her with the conveniences of life. In other
words, the article merely establishes the matrimonial domicile as the domicile
of the husband, and requires the wife to live with him and the husband to
receive her at all times. It may be argued that the obligations imposed in
Article 119 are modified by Article 120, but if so the modification is only to
the extent that a husband may not be required to maintain a wife who does
not choose to live with him in the matrimonial domicile, but it certainly does
not affect the wife's reciprocal duty of support imposed under Article 119.
52. Arts. 230-233, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. La. Act 25 of 1898, as amended, La. R.S. (1950) 9:302.
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need no longer prove a separate residence before being entitled
to the allowance. On the other hand, the effect of the amend-
ments to Article 160 and the independent statute is merely to
bring our law more in line and in accord with the French laws
on the subject. In this connection, it must be noted that in
France, it is only the innocent spouse who has the right to ali-
mony after divorce; if both parties are at fault, neither will be
entitled to it, and, if the divorce has been granted in favor of the
husband, but the separation on which the divorce is based has
been granted in favor of the wife, she will be entitled to alimony
because she is not deemed to have been at fault.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last analysis, our problem is both procedural and sub-
stantive in nature. As has been pointed out, the Civil Code
articles on divorce and separation regulate, not only the substan-
tive private rights of the parties, but also prescribe the procedure
to govern the institution of the action.54
Once the bases for the respective rights and duties of the
parties regarding alimentary allowances is established, there only
remains the question of the mechanics to be employed in enforc-
ing them. The following is suggested as the proper procedure to
be followed:
(1) Upon the institution of a suit, either for separation or
for divorce, the wife may, by rule, bring the husband into court
to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay her alimony
pendente lite. This rule should, for greater protection, be filed'
with the petition if the wife is plaintiff, or with the answer or
even prior thereto, if she is defendant. The court should, after
hearing the rule, order the husband to pay the necessary allow-
ance, if the wife qualifies under the provisions of Article 148.
(2) During the hearing of the case on the merits, testimony
regarding the financial situation of the claimant should be heard
in order to determine whether or not an order for alimony after
the separation or after the divorce should be made.
(3) If it is shown that the claimant is not in necessitous
circumstances, or will not be in necessitous circumstances after
the community property is partitioned, then the judgment de-
creeing the separation or the divorce, as the case may be, should
not contain an order for alimony.
54. See Book I, Title V, Cs. 2, 3, 4, Arts. 140-154, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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(4) The burden will be on the claimant to show necessitous
circumstances to warrant an order for alimony in the judgment
of separation or of divorce. In addition, if the suit is for divorce,
the wife must also show that she has not been at fault.
(5) Upon rendition of the judgment of separation or for
divorce, as the case may be, the alimony pendente lite will cease,
and the claimant will be entitled to alimony only if the judgment
on the merits contains such an order, issued in conformity with
(2), (3), and (4), above.
(6) Should the judgment (which may or may not contain
the order for alimony), is appealed, then the provisional alimony
granted on the rule to show cause will continue, since the litiga-
tion is not ended until the suit is finally determined.
(7) If the judgment does contain an order for alimony, and
the judgment is affirmed on appeal, the order for alimony will
immediately take the place of the order preliminarily issued on
the rule to show cause. It will be the same if the judgment is not
appealed, in which case the judgment of the lower court becomes
final.
On appeal, the parties should be entitled to have the court
pass upon the rights of the claimant vel non to alimony whether
ordered or not included in the judgment appealed from.
(8) In all cases, an appeal should be allowed on the ques-
tion of alimony pendente lite, that is, from the temporary order
for alimony issued on the rule to show cause.
The essential factor is that no order for alimony should be
incorporated in the judgment granting the separation or the
divorce, unless upon proof of the necessitous circumstances of the
claimant (taking into consideration the value of one-half of the
community property to be partitioned as a consequence of the
judgment) and, in cases of divorce, upon a showing that the wife
is not at fault.
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